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2017 has been a year of devastating natural disasters; Hurricane Harvey caused widespread 
flooding in Texas and Louisiana, Hurricanes Irma and Maria wreaked havoc on island states in 
the Caribbean and Latin America, and Mexico has suffered two high magnitude earthquakes 
in quick succession that left hundreds dead and many more citizens’ lives changed forever. 
Manmade disasters, such as terrorism, are also having devastating impact even beyond war 
zones. Large-scale, highly organized attacks, such as the attack on the World Trade Centre, 
have been replaced in recent years by less sophisticated attacks using homemade bombs, guns, 
knives and cars in cities all over the world, from Paris, to Quetta to London.  
 
As these natural and manmade disasters increase in frequency and severity (Allianz, 2015), 
they highlight a steadily widening gap between insured and actual economic losses. Some 70% 
of global losses from natural catastrophes are uninsured, equating to a protection gap of $1.3 
trillion over the past 10 years (Swiss Re, 2015a). Indeed, the total economic loss from 
Hurricane Harvey is estimated at up to $90 billion, of which at best only $35 billion is insured 
(RMS, 2017). Significant gaps in protection also exist for other large-scale threats such as 
terrorism, cybercrime and epidemics, where the emergent or constantly evolving nature of risk 
makes developing adequate insurance protection difficult (Carter & Johansmeyer, 2016; 
Michel-Kerjan, Raschky & Kunreuther, 2015). This protection gap constitutes an economic 
and social problem in both developing and developed countries. Lack of insurance in 
developing countries means that losses from catastrophic disasters roll back development gains 
and exacerbate inequality (World Bank, 2014). Yet in developed countries, the protection gap 
is also increasing (Swiss Re, 2015b). For example, while the United States is one of the most 
insured countries in the world, some 50% of the natural disaster losses in 2016 remained 
unprotected (Aon, 2016). 
 
Beyond existing organizational responses to risk and disaster management. The burden of 
paying for such uninsured losses falls largely on governments, individuals and aid 
organizations, with significant economic and social hardship for those affected. In response, 
governments and inter-governmental organizations around the world, often joining forces with 
the insurance market, have developed a range of different types of insurance schemes that 
attempt to close the protection gap. While these schemes differ considerably, they broadly have 
the same goal which is to transform uninsured risk into insurance-based products that can be 
transferred into global financial markets in order to provide capital for recovery following a 
disaster.  
 
We refer to the entities that convey various schemes as Protection Gap Entities (PGEs), which 
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we define as organizations specifically set up to operate between government and market in 
trying to reduce some specific protection gap. Examples of PGEs include the Caribbean 
Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), which was set up to provide its member 
countries with access to rapid capital for responding to the aftermath of natural disasters, or 
Pool Re, a risk pool set up to support the insurance market in providing commercial terrorism 
cover to businesses in the UK. Such PGEs sit at the nexus of a range of critical 
interdependencies between market and non-market organizations, each with different 
expertise, interests and objectives that must be drawn together to address the protection gap 
problem. PGEs are not static organizations. Rather, their organizing practices simultaneously 
shape and are shaped by the pertinent interdependencies. Further, as ways are found to 
transform uninsured risk into insured risk, and to attract capital, these interdependencies 
evolve, so that PGEs themselves are dynamically evolving in tandem with the risk they process. 
Given the role of organizations as critical agents in “processing and handling risks” (Hutter & 
Power, 2005, p. 1; see also Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 
2016; Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Power, 2014; Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin‐Andersson, & Power, 
2006), an understanding of PGEs as a particular type of risk-processing organization is critical. 
However, we know little of the organizational, intra-organizational and economic and social 
dynamics that shape PGEs, and their respective disaster risk management responses.  
 
Beyond existing understandings of risk, reward and responsibility. Frank Knight’s (1921) 
distinction between risk and uncertainty can be used as a conceptual vehicle to understand risk-
taking as entrepreneurial activity for profit making (O'Malley, 2003). This is apparent in 
markets for large-scale risk, where insurance companies accept risk of loss and responsibility 
for paying claims in return for a premium that is the basis of their profit. These insurers then 
transfer some of this risk of large-scale loss, such as a major flood that damages many 
properties simultaneously, to reinsurers and other capital markets. The reinsurers and markets 
in turn accept this risk and the responsibility to pay for potentially disastrous losses in return 
for a premium which is their basis of profit (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek & Spee, 2015). When 
PGEs are established, they intervene in this risk transfer value chain, acting either as insurers 
taking the risk directly from policyholders or as reinsurers and capital markets that accept risk 
from insurers. Sometimes, particularly in developing economies where the insurance market is 
relatively underdeveloped, they even bypass this value chain altogether, transferring risk 
directly from government balance sheets into the capital markets.  
 
PGEs thus introduce a new type of actor into the value chain, with a mix of often contradictory 
market and non-market objectives (Denis, Langley & Rouleau, 2007; Jarzabkowski, Le & Van 
de Ven, 2013; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke & Spee, 2015), such as a remit to protect citizens 
from economic disaster, rather than specifically to make a profit. The uncoupling of such 
market based calculations of risk and reward may also dilute the responsibility of market 
players to pay claims, as this obligation shifts partially to the PGEs that negotiate the products 
issued against risk. Yet the implications of this intervention, in a market that so critically 
underpins recovery from devastating losses, are poorly understood, conceptually and 
empirically (Bruggeman, Faure & Heldt, 2012; Paudel 2012). In particular, the specific forms 
that PGEs take, how they share risk for public protection and private sector profit, and how 
they co-evolve alongside government policy over time are critical areas of study (Weinkle, 
2015). 
 
For example, the USA public-sector flood insurance scheme, the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), originated in response to the lack of private insurance, providing domestic 
insurance policies to enable householders to recover from damage following floods. However, 
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it has run into severe problems, arguably due to a failure to share risk with the private market 
(Elliott, 2017) until 2015, when some risk was transferred to the reinsurance market, to offset 
NFIP debt. In particular, the scheme has low penetration. During the recent Hurricane Harvey, 
only some 20% of properties eligible for NFIP coverage actually had flood insurance, with 
devastating consequences for citizens and for the states of Texas and Louisiana. As Moody’s 
Analytics noted, “a lack of flood insurance for homeowners will prevent the type of full-scale 
reconstruction effort that might otherwise be expected. This could have significant long-term 
ramifications, weighing on household wealth and consumption, while even potentially making 
a dent in the region’s very strong population growth” (Evans, 2017). 
 
As such critical examples suggest, we need more studies that examine the use of financial tools 
for risk taking, whilst looking beyond this as primarily a matter of market actors and objectives. 
Rather, we need to focus on the reconfiguration of risk, reward and responsibility, in order to 
further existing understandings of how financial markets work in cooperation with the state, 
through the vehicle of specific risk-processing organizations, such as PGEs, to build economic 
and social resilience (e.g. Hamilton & Statman, 1993). In particular, it is necessary to generate 
theories of risk and risk management that explain the changing risk-reward-responsibility 
dynamics arising from the interplay between market and non-market actors and their 
implications on market making. 
 
Our research. Our response to the need for enhanced insight takes a processual approach to 
PGEs as risk-processing organizations that evolve over time. While PGEs are put in place to 
address the protection gap, they are not simply solutions to the problem. Rather, they become 
active participants in defining the protection gap and the potential approaches to it, through the 
interdependencies they establish to evaluate and trade risk, their effects on the market-based 
value chain, their progressive shifting of risk from uninsured to insured, and their consequences 
in increasing insurance penetration and in paying claims following disasters. We are currently 
examining the processual evolution of 12 different PGEs that span different risks, from 
terrorism to floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. Our research, based on data across all relevant 
stakeholders, is designed to capture variation in relational, structural and institutional features 
of these PGEs, from single nation PGEs to multi-nation risk pools, covering both developed 
and developing economies. Taking a comparative approach, we aim to develop two types of 
process theories. First, theories that explain the different paths through which particular types 
of PGEs evolve, and their consequences. Second, process theories that explain how PGEs as 
collective phenomena, through their interactions with each other, and with key multinational 
and inter-organizational actors, shape broader global approaches to risk, the protection gap and 
disaster risk management. 
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